

The End of the European Honeymoon? Refugees, Resentment and the Clash of Solidarities

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ABSTRACT

With the rise of populism, European solidarity risks being eroded by a clash of solidarities based on nation and religion. Ranging from hospitality to hostility, 'refugees welcome' to 'close the borders', asylum seekers from Syria and other war-torn countries test the very ideas upon which the EU was founded: human rights, tolerance and the free movement of people. European solidarity is not only rooted in philosophical ideas of equality and freedom but also in the memory of nationalism, war and violence. The response to refugees seeking asylum into Europe cannot only be resolved by appealing to emotions, moral sentiments and a politics of pity. Disenchantment with government, fear of terrorism and resentment towards foreigners weaken European solidarity at a time when it is needed most.

KEYWORDS

Europe, pity, refugees, resentment, solidarity, statelessness

If the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant the end of ideological divisions on the continent, the rise of right-wing populist and Eurosceptic parties portends the very opposite. The European honeymoon extolling solidarity, civil society, freedom and unity is being eroded by divisive trends of nationalism and xenophobia. Populists from right and left are against established representative government, the EU and globalisation. However, it is only right-wing populists who juxtapose the European project of the free movement of people with an insular nation state. Europe's new right is no longer a fringe movement but is steadily becoming mainstream, testing the very openness of the Europe that was extolled after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Honeymoons are, by nature, short-lived and the European honeymoon is no exception. The political and economic project is showing distinct signs of fatigue. But what about the long-term marriage of this union as it responds to refugees seeking asylum in Europe? If Brexit signals a divided Britain, with 52 per cent of the population suing for



divorce, political responses to the plight of refugees pose morals question about the self-understanding of the EU. With the rise of populism, European solidarity risks being eroded by a clash of solidarities based on nation and religion. Ranging from hospitality to hostility, ‘refugees welcome’ to ‘close the borders’, asylum seekers from Syria and other war-torn countries test the very ideas upon which the European Union was founded: human rights, tolerance and the free movement of people. Hostile responses to the plight of refugees indicate the exclusive primacy of one’s tribe over the needs of others. When faced with non-European refugees seeking asylum into one’s home, clashing solidarities undercut values of human dignity enshrined in the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the Declaration of Human Rights. Likewise, humanitarian pity for the vulnerable is singularly incapable of overcoming populist resentment towards foreigners (Arendt, Fassin, Ticktin). Disenchantment with government, fear of terrorism and resentment towards foreigners weaken European solidarity at a time when it is needed most. At the very core of the European Union is an understanding of solidarity as fraternity combined with the rights of hospitality in Kant’s perpetual peace. Moreover European solidarity is not only rooted in philosophical ideas of equality and freedom but also in the memory of nationalism, war and violence.

The humanitarian crisis at Europe’s borders addresses the moral and political foundation of the European Union’s openness towards strangers and commitment to human rights. Moreover, the sheer scale of people seeking asylum brings core values of European integration encoded into Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union into sharp relief:

Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

If the mood after 1989 was of optimism for a democratic future, the economic crisis of 2008 and refugee crisis of 2015 cracked the bonds of solidarity and heralded a shrinking of the political to that of the friend versus the enemy, the citizen versus the foreigner. When a relationship is in crisis, the first impulse is to return to what united the couple at the very beginning. The same might be said of the European project. Particularly after the Brexit referendum in 2016 and the ensuing limbo of indecisiveness about how and when to leave the EU, the question stands as to whether the remaining twenty-seven countries

share enough common values, political will and historical experiences to maintain the bonds of solidarity. After all, not only are the democratic transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe an integral part of the European project, the foundation of the European Economic Community was created in response to shared experiences of war, genocide and displacement. While the European honeymoon is decisively over, the union requires renewed agreement that the values of European solidarity far outweigh a return to the tribal solidarities of nation and religion during the first half of the twentieth century.

Disenchantment, Resentment and Populism

Fundamentalism and increased terrorist attacks on European soil feed a growing culture of fear and resentment. Likewise, unemployment, austerity policies and economic stagnation have led to bitter disappointment with EU policies. For some, such disappointment has given rise to vitriolic feelings of resentment and frustration. The presidential election of Donald Trump marks a decisive shift from populism as a fringe movement in the United States to entry into political office. As Marine Le Pen remarked after Trump won the American presidential elections, 'Trump made the impossible possible' (Le Pen 2016). Moreover, Trump's executive orders on International Holocaust Remembrance Day (27 January 2017) to suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Programme for 120 days, ban Syrian refugees from entering the U.S. indefinitely and ban citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries for ninety days challenges an international commitment to human rights and the rights of refugees. Trump's executive orders effectively implemented the Schmittian understanding of politics as an existential conflict between friend and enemy into national immigration and asylum policy.

Results of gains for right-wing parties in European national elections in 2016 demonstrate that populist parties are entering the political mainstream: Austria's Freedom Party 35.1 per cent, Swiss People's Party 29 per cent, Danish People's Party 21 per cent, Hungary's Jobbik 21 per cent, True Finns 18 per cent, France's National Front 14 per cent, Sweden Democrats 13 per cent, The Netherlands Freedom Party 10 per cent, Greece's Golden Dawn 7 per cent and Italy's Northern League 4 per cent and Five Star Movement 21.15 per cent (BBC 2016). Germany's AfD had 4.7 per cent of the vote in May 2016; however, after the elections in September, the party received 20.8 per cent in

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and 14.2 per cent in Berlin. As of September 2016, the AfD (*Alternativ für Deutschland*) is represented in ten of Germany's sixteen parliaments and is pushing upwards to 15 per cent of the national vote. Although originally formed as a movement against the common Euro currency in 2013, with the refugee crisis and entrance of more than one million asylum seekers into Germany in 2015, the AfD has been transformed to a nativist party whose members are the self-proclaimed 'children of Merkel'. Moreover, the party leader, Frauke Petry is a polished youthful figure of the new right (Meaney 2016). In addition to populist parties at the national level, far-right wing groups formed their own political party at the European level in June 2015. The Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENL), chaired by Marine Le Pen and Marcel de Graaff represents thirty-nine members from nine countries in the European Parliament.

Que reste-t-il de nos amours? What has happened to the bonds of European solidarity that were extolled in 1989 after the fall of communism, and again in 2004 with the expansion of the European Union into Eastern Europe? What happened to all that good will and hope for a brighter future? Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck have written about how the EU's democratic deficit as technocratic bureaucracy distances ordinary citizens from elites in Brussels (Beck 2013; Habermas 2012). However, today's disenchantment is deeper than disappointment with representative government. Populist parties are able to tap into powerful feelings of resentment and fear about globalisation and immigration. Stefan Dolgert links the rise of right wing parties with deep-seated feelings of resentment. 'Ressentiment is a potent political weapon, as Friedrich Nietzsche knew so well' (Dolgert 2016). Indeed, he suggests that resentment is 'the feeling of impotence that leads to anger directed against enemies we blame for our suffering'. Ressentiment or resentment looks for a scapegoat or enemy to account for the sense of angry injustice that people feel towards those individuals, nations or institutions that threaten them. It is a complex emotion that affects how people act towards others. Originating from the French verb, '*ressentir*', resentment entails the repeated feeling of a negative experience, as well as the inability to let go of that painful feeling. Resentment does not allow a person to go forward; instead he or she remains locked in the past. A resentful person returns to the painful event and harbours grudges and grievances.

When reflecting on the power of resentment and ressentiment in the political sphere, Didier Fassin outlines the difference between Adam Smith's idea of resentment as a moral sentiment and Friedrich

Nietzsche's understanding of resentment as a reactive feeling connected with the creation of moral values (Fassin 2013). In *The Moral Sentiments*, Smith describes resentment as an 'unsocial passion' and response to wrongdoing, while sympathy is a 'social passion'. Resentment is a reaction to pain that is inflicted by another person or group of people. In Smith's eyes: 'Hatred and anger are the greatest poison to the happiness of a good mind' (Smith 2002: 46). Fassin emphasises how resentment, for Smith, is a reaction that tends towards excess. 'Resentment is therefore an unsocial but legitimate passion, which must be tamed by the moral principles that regulate retribution' (Fassin 2013: 251).

In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche argues that resentment denotes repressed feelings against noble morality and dominant power. Slave morality seeks revenge while noble morality forgets wrongdoing and is self-affirming. Resentment includes a complex mixture of envy, impotence, frustration and malice. 'Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own' (Nietzsche 1956: 171). Resentment requires a real or perceived enemy to react against. For Fassin, resentment includes a 'thirst for revenge' and 'value delusions' (Fassin 2013: 252). Max Scheler in his book, *Ressentiment*, defines it as 'the self possessing of the mind caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects' (Scheler quoted in *ibid.*). Moreover, for Scheler: 'Ressentiment is the repeated experiencing and reliving of a particular emotional response reaction against someone else' (Scheler 1905: 2). There is a strong undercurrent of hostility in resentment that feeds the imagination of the one who feels unjustly wronged. Resentment is a kind of 'self-poisoning of the mind' (*ibid.*: 4).

Populist rhetoric taps into deep-seated resentment towards political elites in Brussels, globalisation, closing of factories, stagnating wages, unemployment and the increased presence of foreigners within Europe's open borders. Indeed, Jan-Werner Müller characterises populism as a distinct challenge to democratic representation. Populist parties are anti-elitist and anti-pluralist because they claim to represent 'the people' in an exclusive and unmediated sense. There is little room for pluralism and for working through the process of representative democracy. Instead, populism is the most visceral form of identity politics. 'The danger to democracy today is not some comprehensive ideology that systematically denies democratic ideals. The danger is populism – a degraded form of democracy that promises to make good on democracy's highest ideals ("Let the people rule!")' (Müller

2016: 6). Compared with the optimism of 1989, today's resentment is diverting political debate from solidarity and community to fear of foreigners and disenchantment with politics in general. Populism is, as Müller argues, 'a degraded form of democracy'.

Distant Suffering and the Politics of Pity

Luc Boltanski, like Susan Sontag, argues that the mass media alters how we perceive the suffering of others who are at a distance. With the ubiquity of images and headlines, the indelible media influence moral responses to war and violence. As spectators, the 'distant suffering' of others mediated through images becomes an everyday affair that one can either ignore or be moved by (Boltanski 1999; Sontag 2003). Boltanski expands Arendt's critique of pity entering the political realm during the French Revolution. If the American Revolution emphasised liberty, the French privileged the social question by pitying the poor from afar. Of utmost importance for Boltanski is Arendt's emphasis on the spectator who observes the suffering of the weak. The politics of pity is distinct from the politics of justice (Boltanski 1999: 3–5).

In a similar vein, Didier Fassin argues that humanitarianism is a 'moral landscape' that combines 'the tragedy of ruination and the pathos of assistance' (Fassin 2012: ix). While images of refugee camps in Africa, Lebanon and Turkey might move people, images of refugees in Greece, Italy, Lampedusa, crowds gathered at train stations in Hungary, Germany and Austria closely resemble European refugees of the twentieth century. There is a tangible immediacy to the proximity of refugees in Europe. And yet, as the destruction of the camp in Calais demonstrates, the proximity of the displaced is not sufficient to move people when it is unclear whether the displaced are 'real' refugees or economic migrants. Moral sentiments 'link affect with values – sensitivity with altruism' (ibid.: 1). Humanitarianism deals with natural disaster, war, violence and displacement. As Fassin writes:

Humanitarianism has become familiar through catastrophic events, the images of which have been disseminated by the media, but it has also to do with more ordinary situations closer to us. Indeed, it is a mode of governing that concerns the victims of poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and exile, as well as of disasters, famines, epidemics, and wars – in short, every situation characterized by precariousness (ibid.: x).

In *The Critique of Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*, he argues that humanitarianism is 'the deployment of moral sentiments

in contemporary politics' (ibid.). Moreover, Fassin draws attention to the 'anthropological transformations' of how governments respond to the suffering of others (ibid.: 7). If Trump's response to the plight of refugees against the background of terrorism is a suspension of immigration and asylum in the name of national security, the European response has been divided. Given the legacy of genocide, war and mass displacement of people in Europe during the twentieth century, the question of how to respond fairly to refugees at Europe's borders challenges the foundational ideas of the European Union. Fassin draws attention to the ambivalent etymology of the word 'hospitality'. If *hostis* means enemy, *hospes* denotes a guest. The ambiguity between hospitality and hostility is central to how the foreigner is perceived. In order to extend hospitality to a guest, one needs to have a home or place of residence. Particularly in light of terrorism, national and European immigration policies are caught between an understanding of hospitality as both *hospes* and *hostis* (ibid.: 135–136).

When asked to take in more refugees, former British Prime Minister David Cameron captured the sentiment of many people by stating: 'we can't take anymore'. The German AfD party slogan likewise proclaimed '*Es reicht!*' or 'It's enough!' Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán externalised the refugee issue as a 'German problem', rather than a European one, and argued against German 'moral imperialism'. The Danish government passed an asylum austerity bill allowing authorities to seize refugees' valuables and money in order to support their resettlement. By far the most dramatic response to the refugee crisis has been that of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, with her decision that Germany will grant asylum to those who seek it. Up until the 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey, Merkel has emphasised moral responsibility over indifference, hospitality over hostility, with her steadfast resolve that 'we will cope' (*wir schaffen das*), otherwise Germany would 'not be my country'. Terrorist attacks in Germany and the gains by the AfD in September 2016 have forced Merkel to rethink her refugee policy. However, she remains steadfast in her resolve to see the moral contours of the refugee crisis for Germany and Europe as a whole. In response to calls from the CDU not to accept more foreigners, she emphasised: 'This would be against our basic law, our obligations under international law, but above all also against the ethical foundations of the CDU' (Merkel quoted in Brenner 2016). That the EU-led imperative of hospitality and solidarity towards an equitable distribution of refugees fuelled the rise of populist parties is hardly surprising; however, the transformation of parties such as AfD

and Le Pen from fringe to mainstream signals a new direction in European post-war politics. Indeed, Thorsten Brenner argues: ‘the AfD has revitalized some of the themes advanced by protofascists of the inter-war period, whom the historian Fritz Stern labelled “conservative revolutionaries” for their potent mixture of traditionalism with anti-establishment rage’ (Brenner 2016).

The negative response in various East European countries towards helping refugees caught many off guard, particularly given the fact that many in the previous generation were themselves refugees, who fled war and violence during the twentieth century. Slovakian President Robert Fico was ready to accept Christians only. Viktor Orban achieved notoriety with his decision in the summer of 2015 to seal the Hungarian border with a razor fence and his suggestion in September 2016 to deport refugees to camps ‘on an island or North Africa’ much like Hitler’s plan to deport Jews to Madagascar during the Second World War (Olipant 2016). Historian, Timothy Garton Ash (2015) notes the irony of building walls in Europe after the fall of the long-standing Berlin Wall. ‘What we are seeing in 2015 is Europe’s reverse 1989’.

Political scientist Ivan Krastev analysed what he called ‘Eastern Europe’s compassion deficit’ (2015), while historian Jan Gross remarked on ‘Eastern Europe’s crisis of shame’ (2015). In a similar vein, Jacques Rupnik asks how such a backlash is possible from citizens who emigrated due to communist repression from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1981 and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. ‘Is this amnesia or is solidarity supposed to remain solely intra-European?’ (Rupnik 2015). Have memories of an earlier European refugee crisis been forgotten or selectively remembered? Solidarity as the iconic and powerful symbol of Polish civil society and, by extension, of a Europe united against ideological division risks erosion by complex feelings of resentment and xenophobia.

Humanitarian Aid and the Problematic Ideal of Innocence

The response to refugees seeking asylum into Europe cannot be resolved by appealing to emotions, moral sentiments and a politics of pity. Like Boltanski and Arendt, Miriam Ticktin is wary of the language of pity and care in humanitarian situations:

We need a different form of political care – beyond care as welfare, which is tied to the sovereignty of nation-states, and includes the enforcement of borders – and beyond humanitarianism, which is tied to innocence,

emergency and compassion. That is, we need to think beyond care as a very particular array of moral sentiments and social arrangements (Ticktin 2016b: 266).

The problem with regarding refugees as innocent or guilty is the tendency to see refugees as either innocent passive victims or as guilty terrorists. In many cases, this is entirely true – the refugees are innocent civilians fleeing war; however, she cautions that such a facile understanding designates refugees as either innocent or guilty. They cannot be somewhere in between. Particularly when populists tend to conflate refugees with terrorists, the binary categorisation of displaced persons as either innocent or guilty is politically charged. Moreover, the economic migrant falls into a grey zone that is neither innocent nor guilty, and lives outside of the rule of law.

The politics of pity creates a hierarchy of inequality between active humanitarian aid workers and passive masses of refugees. As Boltanski, Ticktin and Fassin underscore in their reading of Arendt, pity engages the hierarchy of spectator and sufferer, whereas solidarity regards human beings as equals. ‘For solidarity, because it partakes of reason, and hence of generality, is able to comprehend a multitude conceptually, not only the multitude of a class or a nation or a people, but eventually all mankind’ (Arendt 1963: 88). Writing about the French Revolution, Arendt cautions against pity entering the political realm precisely because of the power relations that are automatically engaged. ‘Laws and all “lasting institutions” break down not only under the onslaught of elemental evil but under the impact of absolute innocence as well’ (Arendt 1973: 84). According to Ticktin, the three-year-old boy, Alan Kurdi whose body was washed up on a Turkish beach in 2015 was precisely the pure image of innocence. ‘It shamed Europe into action’ (Ticktin 2016b: 258). However, even the most compassionate acts to help other refugees after the boy’s death are linked with policing and life in displacement camps.

Although humanitarian aid for refugees is administered by aid workers, doctors and volunteers, the process of registering and settling refugees is closely linked with border patrols, the police and Frontex. As Seyla Benhabib and Didier Fassin argue, humanitarian aid to refugees unwittingly moves away from the language of human rights and the protection of individuals to the administration of displaced people in refugee camps (Benhabib 2014; Fassin 2012). Humanitarianism is a kind of biopolitics or the administration and control of people’s bodies. In an essay on the design of the Calais camp, Ticktin argues that humanitarian aid unwittingly becomes an apparatus to

control the very people they wish to protect. ‘While humanitarianism works to address the urgency of suffering (offering emergency shelter, food and medical care), it is based on a dual logic of protection and surveillance’ (Ticktin 2016a: 29). For example, migrants in Calais were viewed as threats to the French state and were unwanted by the U.K. ‘These dual logics – protection/ surveillance, and innocence/ threat – are built into humanitarian designs’ (ibid.: 30). She asks how putting migrants and refugees into container camps affects their ‘ontological status as humans’ (ibid.: 32). Are they regarded as things or goods stored at the margins rather than people with human dignity? ‘In this sense, the humanitarian camps at the edge of Europe do not simply enact a racialized politics of citizenship, deciding who can enter and belong to Europe; they embody a politics of humanity, which works by constantly reordering the boundaries of the human’ (ibid.). The destruction of ‘the Jungle’ in 2016 effectively moved those who lived in the camp to the streets and margins of French society. With an ambiguous status between refugee and economic migrant, neither innocent nor guilty, the residents of the Calais camp were effectively placed outside of human rights and the Geneva Convention.

Statelessness and Refugee Camps

Without engaging in pity or a discussion of innocence versus guilt, Arendt wrote first hand about her eighteen years of statelessness, displacement and adjustment to life in the United States. She described the daily experiences that refugees of her generation shared in common. In the 1943 article ‘We Refugees’ (see Arendt 2007), Arendt invokes a community of shared experience that those who left their home due to war and violence share. Moreover, she describes a political space of limbo and dependence upon the charity of strangers and mercy of the state. ‘We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings’ (Arendt 2007: 264).

As she underlined, statelessness is a modern phenomenon and a direct consequence of the international order of nation states. Stateless from 1933 to 1951, Arendt examined the phenomenon of statelessness within the context of the nation state, imperialism and totalitarianism. The collapse of the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and

Russian empires produced people who suddenly found themselves characterised as minorities or stateless. As she wrote, 'If one regards European history as the development of the European nation-state, or as the development of the European peoples into nation-states, then these people, the stateless, are the most important product of recent history' (Arendt 2007: 128). The same could be said for the many refugees throughout the world today. 'A refugee used to be a person driven to seek refuge because of some act committed or some political opinion held ... Now "refugees" are those of us who have been so unfortunate as to arrive in a new country without means and have to be helped by refugee committees' (Arendt 2007: 264). As Arendt highlights, the stateless person becomes a pariah or outlaw at the discretion of the sovereign state. Once they have lost their citizenship, they are left only with their humanity. And it was precisely their mere humanity or, what Giorgio Agamben describes as their 'bare life', that failed them. It is membership in a political community alone that grounds rights. The rights of man and citizen are problematic because individual rights are located at the intersection of their humanity and membership in a political community. Statelessness means that a person is simply human, hence barely at the intersection of human and citizen. Statelessness causes the vulnerable refugee to rely on political institutions of the state, international relief organisations, charities and individual good will. 'The conception of human rights, based on the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships – except that they were human' (Arendt 1973: 299).

For Arendt and those of her generation, among them Walter Benjamin and Stefan Zweig, to be left with only one's humanity meant the loss of one's world and the loss of any rights. Although today's refugees should be protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention on Refugees, they can still be placed outside of the law during times of national emergency as President Trump's executive orders demonstrate. Hence, Arendt's caution against embracing human rights as a solid guarantee against mass statelessness remains valid today. How can one guarantee the rights of the stateless to be treated with dignity and hospitality when they seek refuge? Jürgen Habermas underscores the historical context during which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written and the importance of codifying the concept of human dignity into law:

It is an interesting fact that it was only after the end of the Second World War that the philosophical concept of human dignity, which already existed in antiquity and acquired its current canonical expression in Kant, found its way into texts of international law and into national institutions that came into force in the postwar period (Habermas 2012: 73).

Human rights only came into effect after the Second World War with the recognition of genocide and crimes against humanity. As Habermas reminds his readers: ‘Human rights are the product of violent and at times revolutionary struggles for recognition’ (ibid.: 92).

Great Expectations, Hospitality and the ‘Clash of Solidarities’

Revisiting the expectations of 1989 is a bit like walking into a history museum. One can read the documents, watch the video clips and listen to the testimonials; nonetheless, one remains highly aware of the passing of time. The coloured photographs are not as bright, the hair-styles and clothes charmingly dated – and yet, when thinking of the peaceful protests against communism, one senses boundless optimism in the faces of dissidents and ordinary citizens as they protested in the name of freedom. There was real hope that politics would not be reduced into empty promises by political elites for their own gain. Likewise, the marginalisation or stigmatisation of strangers was downplayed in favour of goals of unity and solidarity.

As the narrow margin for Brexit demonstrated, much of today’s disenchantment lies with the fear that foreigners will take jobs away from nationals. There is a profound sense that European bureaucrats and political elites are out of touch with the very real needs of their constituents. Prime Minister Theresa May went so far as to reclaim the primacy of national citizenship over being a citizen of the world. ‘But if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word “citizenship” means’ (May 2016). The gap between national and European representation has been a point of deep contention for individuals from both the left and the right. The different responses to the refugee crisis lie at the core of how Europe defines itself with respect to the values of human dignity and respect for others. As Ivan Krastev argues: ‘What we see is not a lack of solidarity; what we see is a *clash of solidarities*: national, ethnic and religious solidarity chafing against our obligations as human beings’ (Krastev 2015; my emphasis).

Solidarity as a sense of commonality or fellow feeling is notoriously difficult to define. In his book, *Solidarity*, Hauke Brunkhorst defends the idea that solidarity is accompanied by democracy. One cannot have one without the other. The egalitarian understanding of solidarity is rooted in Judeo-Christianity. Moreover, the Roman origins of obligation *in solidum* bind strangers together into bonds of mutual obligation. Brunkhorst argues that the shift from *solidum* to *fraternité* occurred most strongly with Rousseau's *Social Contract*. While the tradition of the social contract depicts the relationship between the people and the state, it is with Rousseau that the people are assembled into a sovereign body so that even the humblest citizen should be treated the same as a magistrate. Notions of civic friendship (*philia, amicitia*) coincide with Christian brotherliness (*fraternité*) and love of neighbour (*agape, caritas*). As Brunkhorst writes: 'The modern conception of democracy is the heir of two traditions: Judeo-Christian brotherly solidarity and Greco-Roman civic solidarity' (2005: 55).

The fraternal bonds of solidarity play an important role in how we understand community. The ideals of the French Revolution, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, are based on the powerful bonds of brotherly love. And yet, not all brothers love one another. Zygmunt Bauman (2016) reminds us of the infamous brothers: Eteocles and Polynices were rivals who killed one another on the battlefield in Sophocles' *Antigone*. Romulus killed his brother Remus and founded Rome. Cain slew Abel and asked whether he had any obligation to his brother. Blood ties do not necessarily guarantee fraternity. When Immanuel Kant reflected on the social contract and the ties that bind individuals together, he examined it from the dream of perpetual peace and the relationship between host and guest, not brothers:

The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.

Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of rights. Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may demand. ... It is only a right to temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. They have it by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must fully tolerate the presence of each other (Kant 1991: 284).

Kantian hospitality is the 'right to associate' and the negative right not to be treated as an enemy when he or she arrives 'in the land of another'. Kant also emphasises that the guest should be treated as a guest if he does not harm the host. Of utmost importance in the Kantian framework of hospitality is the temporal nature of the bond. The guest is not supposed to stay. Hence, Kantian hospitality is limited to 'temporary sojourn' and 'a right to associate'. What has inspired thinkers from Arendt to Derrida, Habermas and Bauman is the way in which Kant grounds hospitality as a right rather than as an act of charity or kindness. Hospitality is not granted to an innocent victim and denied for those who are guilty. The act of offering hospitality to another person is not an act of pity for those who are unfortunate. Rather, for Kant, hospitality is grounded on the surface of the earth that all people share – whether brothers or strangers. It is hospitality limited to the kinship of the host and guest. The difficulty that societies face today when translating Kant's right of hospitality from the individual home to the nation state or European Union, is what to do when the guest does not go away, but remains. Within his framework of host and guest, rather than fraternity, while we may be citizens of different nation states, we all share the world and 'must fully tolerate the presence of each other'. We are not simply 'citizens of nowhere' as Theresa May suggests but have the responsibility to tolerate and share the world with one another.

Re-kindling Solidarity through an Historical Recognition of Peace

Conflicted responses to the refugee crisis confirm that the European honeymoon is over and the durability of the marriage under question. Whilst the expansion of the EU in 2004 was undertaken in a spirit of solidarity, prolonged economic crisis, nationalist agendas and protracted austerity measures have eroded the spirit of 1989. The economic crisis of 2008, refugee crisis of 2015 and Brexit in 2016 crystallised what has been brewing for more than a decade. But does the end of a honeymoon mean the break-up of marriage? Has resentment won over hope and solidarity? Of vital importance to the legitimacy of the European Union is a shared commitment to the core values that populist parties deplore: pluralism, tolerance, human dignity and freedom of speech.

During the Second World War, another Jewish refugee, Karl Popper, left his native Austria and sought political asylum first in New

Zealand, then in Great Britain. While in New Zealand, he wrote that although an open society cannot guarantee perfect order, there are ways to live with uncertainty. Utopian ideals have historically led to violence towards those who do not fit it to a perfect society. Popper reminds us of two tenets that characterise the open society. 'Love your neighbour, say the Scriptures, not "love your tribe"'. The corollary to love of neighbour is the Kantian dignity of the person: 'always recognize that human individuals are ends, and do not use them as mere means to your end' (Popper 2003: 108). The dignity of the individual is the foundation of the open society, not the closure of the tribe. It is, however, in the second part of his title that Popper offers the most food for thought. *The Open Society and its Enemies* is often interpreted as the enemies from outside who threaten the polis. However, Popper cautioned against the enemies within the walled city. 'The more we try to return to the heroic age of tribalism, the more surely do we arrive at the inquisition, at the Secret Police, and at a romanticized gangsterism' (Popper 2003: 214). Tribal politics signal the end of solidarity and, even more disturbingly, recall a violently fractured Europe in the midst of two world wars. The stateless experiences of Hannah Arendt and Karl Popper during the twentieth century are testament to a time when violent hatred towards Jews was transformed into state policies of exclusion and genocide.

Although right-wing populist parties and deep-seated feelings of resentment towards political elites and refugees do not show immediate signs of abating, one cannot dismiss the fact that there has been peace in Europe for the longest time in living memory. The clash of solidarities and tribal nationalisms in the twentieth century were confronted with the European project of solidarity in exchange for a lasting peace among member states. Europe's fragile peace seems to be easily forgotten in the rancour surrounding the refugee crisis, austerity and anti-elitism. At the end of the day, the peace that European member states experience is profound and should give citizens renewed hope in representative democracy and European institutions. This sense of solidarity is not naïve but rooted in Kant's realisation that perpetual peace is only possible when sovereign states are structurally interconnected and give up part of their national sovereignty. The initial creation of the European Steel and Coal Community was an extraordinary step towards cooperation between hostile neighbours. Likewise, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Geneva Convention on Refugees in 1951 and its expansion in 1967 are the foundation of much of today's international

political order. One need only recall Yugoslavia in the 1990s or look at the war in Ukraine to realise the frailty of peace on the continent. The speed with which Donald Trump is ignoring international treaties that protect refugees and guarantee human rights confirms the importance of European solidarity. Although the honeymoon of 1989 is over, the first step towards rekindling solidarity among Europeans might begin with the candid historical recognition of just how important this peace has been since 1945.

Conclusion

The question of how to respond to refugees seeking entry into Europe, in conjunction with increased terrorist attacks on the continent poses the greatest challenge to the European Union since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although the European honeymoon has reached its end, the marriage is still intact. Populists are able to appeal to deep feelings of resentment, fear of terrorism and disenchantment with politics and globalisation. Likewise, they are able to inspire xenophobia and hatred. Such appeals are divisive and lead to clashes of tribal solidarities. The European project is founded on the shared experience of war, violence and genocide during the twentieth century. Solidarity is rooted in the recognition of the human dignity of individuals as written in the Treaty of the European Union, as well as the right to asylum as enshrined in the Geneva Convention on Refugees. By appealing to human rights and rights to asylum, there is a stronger chance for burden sharing and the integration of refugees. As Hannah Arendt, Luc Boltanski, Didier Fassin and Miriam Ticktin argue, a politics of pity is the opposite of solidarity and justice. Pitying refugees is not sufficient for overcoming resentment towards foreigners. Rather than engage in pity or the logic of innocence and guilt, solidarity appeals to what all individuals share in common – their equal moral worth and their rights as individuals. The recognition of human rights and desire for peace appeals to justice, not pity. More importantly, unlike the American constitution or the Federalist Papers, European solidarity is not only based on abstract ideas of freedom and equality but also on the historical recognition of the failures of individual nation states to protect individuals when tribal solidarities clashed over religion and nationalism.

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